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Abstract 
 
Law plays a central role in the management of risk in society. The rules adopted by regulatory 
agencies now affect nearly every facet of the economy, and as such regulation has motivated a 
substantial body of academic research. Law and economics research on regulation has, first, 
demonstrated the normative justification for governmental intervention in the marketplace based 
on the concept of market failure. Second, political economy research on regulation has shown 
how, as a positive matter, interest groups, political movements, and public pressure affect the 
stringency of such regulation, sometimes more than any normative rationale for regulation. 
Third, risk regulation research has clarified the available normative principles that can guide the 
selection of regulatory stringency, from a zero-risk principle to cost-benefit balancing. Finally, 
the law and economics literature on risk regulation offers lessons about the form or design of 
regulatory instruments, from traditional “command-and-control” standards to more innovative 
possibilities, such as market-based instruments or management-based regulation. 
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The Law and Economics of Risk Regulation 
 
Cary Coglianese 
 
 
From the origins of the common law era to the present-day regulatory state, governments 
have always used law as a means of risk management. Today law plays a central role in 
managing a variety of risks associated with the modern economy. The many laws governing 
financial institutions and investment practices seek to protect society from undesirable economic 
risks such as fraud or insolvency. Other laws regulate manufacturing operations in an attempt to 
protect workers from occupational risks and neighbors from environmental risks. Laws seek to 
protect consumers from injuries from unsafe products, travelers from transportation accidents, 
and all citizens from risks of criminal or terrorist violence. 
Given law’s important role in addressing risk in society, scholars have devoted 
considerable attention to risk regulation, with both normative and positive research. An initial 
normative question has centered on the justifications for governmental regulation of the 
marketplace [1]. Accepting the need for risk regulation, researchers have studied, as a positive 
matter, the process by which regulatory standards are established and implemented, as well as 
have evaluated whether alternative decision-making procedures achieve their intended 
objectives. A central substantive issue in risk regulation focuses on the proper level of risk 
protection that regulatory standards should strive to achieve. Whatever the level of appropriate 
risk protection, a final issue considers the form or design of risk regulatory instruments. Much 
research in recent decades on the regulation of health, safety, and environmental risks has 
focused on each of these issues in an effort to contribute policy-relevant knowledge for those 
officials who seek to use law as means of risk management. 
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The Basis for Risk Regulation 
In theory, the common law of contracts, which allows the participants in market 
transactions to allocate economic risks between themselves, might initially be thought to be the 
only law needed for purposes of risk management. If individuals faced no transaction costs and 
possessed perfect information about the risks of different activities, they could presumably 
bargain with each other so that society’s most valued economic activities would continue while 
taking optimal measures to protect those who would be harmed from such activities [2]. Those 
consumers who want to pay more for risk reduction can do so, and the market in principle should 
adjust to meet individuals’ varied demands for safety. But “[t]he difficulty here, of course, is 
that markets are far from perfect” [3: p. 82]. Given the existence of transaction and information 
costs, contracting over risk does not occur as would be optimal. As a result, even at the common 
law, judges recognized that other legal principles, namely tort principles of nuisance as well as 
more recently through products liability, were needed both to provide compensation to injured 
individuals but also to serve as a disincentive for socially suboptimal risky activity [4, 5]. 
The threat of tort liability serves to deter risky behavior, especially given the size of some 
jury awards [6, 7], and in this way tort law can be said to serve a “regulatory” function by 
inducing more optimal levels of care. Tort law in principle holds certain advantages as a 
regulatory mechanism [8]. Unlike the often tightly defined prescription of contemporary 
regulation, the open-ended standards of the common law (such as “unreasonable” harm) makes 
liability more readily adaptable to changing circumstances. Rather than prospectively addressing 
sometimes speculative risks, common law liability applies only to harms that actually occur, and 
it also places principal decision-making authority in the hands of judges who may be far less 
subject to interest group pressures than legislators or regulatory officials. Finally, when liability 
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rules place no-fault responsibility on the least-cost avoider of the risk, this can induce firms to 
produce safer products and processes [9]. Insurance coverage can provide further incentives for 
risk reduction, both because insurance companies can set premiums based on risk levels as well 
as because they can condition coverage on compliance with basic safety principles [1]. 
On the other hand, some of these same purported advantages of tort law can be 
disadvantages [8]. For example, judges may well be more independent, but they are also much 
less knowledgeable about science and risk analysis than are experts within centralized regulatory 
agencies. More significantly, tort liability may provide less-than-optimal levels of deterrence for 
society. Despite their theoretical advantages for pricing risk, liability insurance markets may, 
like any market, operate imperfectly or may not cover all types of harms. The availability of 
bankruptcy may also blunt some of the deterrent effects of tort liability. Business decision 
makers may underestimate the probability that their activities will cause harm to others, thereby 
underestimating their liability for such harm [10, 11]. The litigation process itself can be slow 
and costly, both for society as well as for plaintiffs seeking recovery, which may keep some 
number of meritorious cases from being pursued. The injured party bears the burden of proof, 
and especially when injured parties are poor, they may not pursue litigation at a level needed to 
create a socially optimal level of deterrence. In addition, when there are many injured parties 
(such as in cases of pollution or major industrial accidents), these individuals will face collective 
action problems in organizing to seek recovery [12]. If many individuals are harmed only 
slightly, the overall level of harm to society may still vastly exceed the overall benefits from the 
underlying economic activity, but each individual will have little reason to pursue costly 
litigation. As a result of these limitations, the level of deterrence provided by tort liability will 
often prove to be much lower than is socially desirable [7]. 
 4 
For these kinds of reasons, regulation has been recognized as necessary to supplement, or 
even replace, common law liability [13]. Regulation – that is, imposing more specific, 
prospective risk reduction requirements -- is preventive rather than reactive. Regulatory 
intervention in the marketplace has been generally viewed as justified in instances of market 
failure such as information asymmetries (consumer product risks or workplace health and safety 
risks) and negative externalities (environmental risks or major industrial or nuclear power 
accidents) [14, 15]. As a result, although common law liability remains in place, the rate of 
regulation has grown dramatically over the last century and regulatory agencies, rather than 
courts, have today become the primary source of law affecting risk management. 
 
The Process of Risk Regulation 
Given the critical role of regulation, scholars have focused on how regulatory agencies 
make law. Although the normative case for regulation to address market failures has been 
generally accepted, this does not mean that all regulation is motivated by such public interested 
reasons or that adequate levels of regulation will always be put in place. On the contrary, positive 
research on the process of regulation has suggested that risk regulation can depart from 
normative ideals and instead fall prey to the dictates of interest group and electoral politics [16]. 
Businesses that would incur costs under regulation can be expected to oppose the establishment 
of stringent regulation, and they are better organized in the policy process than are the 
beneficiaries of regulation, who may be numerous but who have only diffuse interests at stake 
[17]. As a result, government may undersupply public regulatory protection just as with common 
law protection. The same collective action problems that serve as a barrier to tort litigation in 
cases of diffuse and unorganized victims of pollution or other harms may also dampen the 
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pressure for regulatory responses to such harms. 
The close, interactive relationships that arise between government and industry can 
potentially lead to regulatory capture, a situation where government protects an industry’s 
interests at the expense of the broader public’s interests [18, 19]. In some cases, capture can be 
expected to lead to less regulation, or less stringent regulation, than would be optimal. In other 
cases, business interests actually may support stringent regulation in order to impose costs on 
new competitors [20, 21]. Risk regulation will sometimes include “grandfather” clauses that 
exempt existing uses or otherwise apply more stringent control requirements on new sources of 
risk, which can impose cost barriers to the entry of competitors [22, 23]. 
Despite the real pressures business organizations can exert on the regulatory process, the 
expansive growth of regulation over the past half-century cannot be easily squared with 
regulatory capture. If industry controlled the process of making regulation, developed countries 
presumably would not have witnessed as expansive a growth in regulation addressing consumer 
protection, workplace safety, and environmental protection [24]. As economies have developed 
and educational levels have increased, members of the public today are less tolerant of a variety 
of risks than were previous generations [25]. Industry no doubt remains a politically important 
force in regulatory policymaking, but the increased political demand for regulation generally, 
along with the development of well-organized labor, environmental, and consumer rights 
movements, has led to the creation of new regulatory agencies and greater levels of regulatory 
control over the last fifty years [26, 27]. Competition across different jurisdictions may also 
sometimes create a “race to the top” in regulatory protection, as politicians in states or nations 
with less stringent regulations try to emulate jurisdictions with more stringent regulations in 
order to satisfy the demands of an increasingly risk averse public [28]. 
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Risk regulation in advanced economies like the United States has evolved through an 
interplay between the legislature and the bureaucracy. Legislatures pass laws that typically 
provide general frameworks for risk management, leaving responsibility for implementing those 
general frameworks to regulatory agencies. For example, the U.S. Clean Air Act instructs the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set ambient air quality standards at a level “requisite 
to protect the public health” with “an adequate margin of safety,” but leaves it up to the EPA to 
decide what that actual level should be for a given air pollutant [29]. This delegation of 
regulatory authority from the legislature to the agency, especially under the terms of broad 
statutory language like that in the Clean Air Act example, create the conditions for a principal 
agent problem – that is, the likelihood that regulators will stray from what the legislature 
intended [30, 31]. In a democracy, who or what controls the unelected bureaucrats who establish 
risk standards? 
Two complementary theories have emerged in the study of U.S. risk regulation, one that 
emphasizes control by the President and one that emphasizes ongoing control by the Congress. 
Presidents exert influence over regulatory agencies by appointing the individuals who run them, 
overseeing their budget requests, and reviewing their most significant regulatory proposals [32]. 
Congress can also continue to exert influence over regulatory agencies by calling their 
administrators to testify and, more significantly, using the appropriations process as a carrot or 
stick [33, 34]. Researchers find evidence that both Presidents and Congress affect the behavior 
of regulatory agencies [35, 36, 37, 38]. 
Some scholars emphasize the role of administrative procedure in affecting what 
bureaucrats do and in holding them accountable to the elected branches of government. For 
example, the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 requires agencies to issue public notices 
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of proposed rules and to give the public an opportunity to comment on these proposals before 
enacting them. Procedural requirements like these can help ensure that the same interest groups 
that supported an initial legislative delegation to an agency will have continued influence over 
that agency’s actions [39, 40]. Interest groups can serve as surrogate monitors for the legislature, 
pulling a “fire alarm” when an agency seems to stray too far from the direction the Congress 
intended [34]. At its extreme, the theory of procedural control posits that Congress uses 
administrative procedures to “stack the deck” in ways that ensure agencies will carry out 
legislative preferences [39, 40]. 
To date, the development of the theory of procedural control seems to have outpaced 
empirical support for the strong, stack-the-deck version of the theory [41, 42, 43]. But scholarly 
interest in administrative procedure has much deeper roots than just the recent theory of 
procedural control. Administrative law scholars have long posited that procedures could be used 
to advance a variety of desirable qualities in regulatory policy [44]. For example, they have 
favored opportunities for judicial review in order to encourage greater adherence to law and to 
promote better policy reasoning [45]. They have urged the use of innovations such as negotiated 
rulemaking to reduce regulatory conflict and speed up regulatory decision-making [46]. Both 
legal scholars and economists have advocated procedural requirements for economic analyses of 
proposed rules as a means of promoting more efficient regulatory outcomes [47]. A growing 
empirical literature tests the claims advocates make for various forms of administrative 
procedure, often finding mixed or even negative results [48]. 
Whether or not procedures achieve substantial benefits in terms of improved decision 
making, some scholars have expressed concern that the simple accretion of procedural 
requirements imposed on agencies has come to hamper their ability to enact needed regulatory 
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protections. Some have posited that a “paralysis by analysis” or “ossification” now grips the 
U.S. regulatory process [49, 50, 51]. As with the purported benefits of regulatory procedure, 
these purported costs are subject to empirical investigation. To date, however, no systematic 
research has confirmed fears that procedures have placed any discernible barrier in the way of 
new regulation [48, 52, 53, 54, 55]. 
Comparative research on risk regulation across different developed economies provides 
another way of assessing the effects that procedural or other institutional structures have on 
regulatory outcomes. The management of risk varies widely across jurisdictions [56]. Do the 
structures of regulatory policy making, or just more conventional political factors such as 
political parties or voter ideologies, explain differences in risk regulation across jurisdictions? 
Some countries in Europe have more “corporatist” regulatory structures that rely on formal 
collaboration between selected industry groups, labor representatives, and government officials; 
others like the U.S. are much more “pluralist” in allowing interest groups to compete against 
each other in an open, adversarial manner [57]. Although early work suggested that corporatist 
regulatory structures might lead to greater environmental controls [58], it appears that stringency 
of environmental regulation is not related to institutional structures but rather (and not 
surprisingly) to the political strength of green and left-libertarian political parties [59]. 
 
Setting Risk Standards 
Regulatory stringency is the core substantive issue at stake in setting risk management 
standards. Put simply, the issue has often been characterized by the question: How safe is safe? 
Answering this question requires making a normative decision about how much risk members of 
the public should confront in their lives. Setting risk standards “necessarily requires the use of 
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value judgments on such issues as the acceptability of risk and the reasonableness of the costs of 
control” [60]. 
In making these value judgments about risk, decision-makers can adhere to one of four 
basic normative principles or approaches [61]: 
(1) Eliminate all risk – or at least all man-made risk (the zero-risk approach); 
(2) Reduce risk to an acceptable level (the acceptable risk approach); 
(3) Reduce risk until the cost of doing so reaches an unacceptable level (the feasibility 
(4) approach); and 
(5) Balance the benefits of risk reduction with the costs (the efficiency approach). 
The zero risk approach appeals to an intuitive notion of safety that implies complete 
freedom from any potential harm. Some laws appear to require this approach, such as the Clean 
Air Act’s provisions calling for standards that “protect the public health” with “an adequate 
margin of safety.” The European Union’s precautionary principle could also be viewed as 
indicative of a risk elimination approach [62]. 
In the context of setting environmental risk standards, a zero risk approach would require 
standards set at levels below some exposure threshold at which adverse health effects occur. If, 
as seems increasingly the case for many chemicals, a give pollutant is non-threshold in that some 
adverse effects arise from even the lowest levels of exposure, a zero risk approach may require 
the complete elimination of the economic activity that relies upon or generates the chemical, 
even if doing so would create substantial, negative economic consequences. It is also possible, 
of course, that eliminating one kind of risk entirely will exacerbate another kind of risk. A 
standard that requires the removal of harmful substances from automobile brake pads may 
protect auto workers and mechanics but could very well increase the risks from automobile 
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accidents. In cases of such “risk-risk tradeoffs” [63], the zero-risk approach can at best become a 
minimize-risk approach under which the regulator sets a standard at the non-zero level at which 
the marginal adverse effects of an economic activity equals the marginal adverse effects from 
reducing or controlling that activity. 
Rather than seeking to eliminate or minimize risk, a second principled approach would 
reduce risk to an acceptable level. For example, no matter how much transportation safety 
regulation exists, anything short of banning airplane flights will always leave some residual risk 
of injuries and fatalities from air travel. A transportation safety regulator could nevertheless act 
to reduce risks to an acceptable, even if non-zero, level. In other contexts, regulators have also 
followed this approach. The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) uses 
a benchmark mortality level of 1 in 1,000 as the basis for its occupational health standards and 
the U.S. EPA has sometimes deemed individual mortality risks below 1 in 10,000 to be 
acceptable [61]. 
An acceptable risk approach has its limitations. For one, an acceptable risk approach 
needs benchmarks not just for mortality risks as EPA and OSHA have used but also for 
morbidity risks. A reason agencies have not developed as clear a set of benchmarks for 
morbidity risks is that it is much harder to determine what those appropriate benchmarks should 
be. Regulators also must grapple with the choice between individual risk and population risk, as 
even a tiny individual risk could lead to a large total public health effect if a vast proportion of 
the population is exposed to a risk [61]. Determining what level should be deemed “acceptable” 
will most likely call for difficult value judgments; it is far from self-evident whether 1 in 1,000 
or 1 in 10,000 is the right level. Moreover, an acceptable risk approach disregards costs 
altogether, implying that regulators must act to reduce risks to an “acceptable” level even when 
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the costs of doing so are disproportionately (and unacceptably) high. Correspondingly, the 
acceptable risk approach directs regulators to avoid reducing risks below the acceptable level, 
even when the costs of doing so would be de minimus. 
A third approach – the feasibility principle -- emphasizes costs in much the same way 
that the acceptable risk approach emphasizes benefits. The feasibility principle directs regulators 
to tighten the stringency of risk standards to the point at which the costs of complying with the 
standard reaches an unacceptable level. For example, the U.S. Congress has directed OSHA to 
develop toxic exposure standards that will protect workers from harm “to the extent feasible” – 
that is, up to the point at which costs become unacceptable [64]. Just as regulating to achieve 
levels of acceptable risk disregards costs, regulating to avoid levels of unacceptable costs 
disregards the benefits of risk control. A risk standard might be infeasible in the sense that it 
would force the shut-down of a major industry, but if doing so would save tens of thousands of 
lives, such economic disruption is almost surely worth it. The U.S. phase out of lead as an 
additive in gasoline seems a good example where high costs, even the significant contraction of a 
major industry, were clearly justified in order to secure significant public health benefits [65]. 
Cost-benefit balancing, the fourth principle for setting risk management standards, avoids 
the problems of the acceptable risk and unacceptable cost approaches [66]. By taking both costs 
and benefits into consideration, the balancing principle directs regulators to set risk standards at 
the socially efficient level, that is, the level that maximizes net benefits (i.e., benefits minus 
costs). If tightening a risk standard will generate high costs and deliver only few benefits, it 
should not be adopted. On the other hand, even if only a few benefits come from making a 
standard incrementally more stringent, doing so will be justified if the incremental costs are even 
lower than the incremental benefits. In the U.S., the efficiency principle has been not only 
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favored by economists [67] but has also been embedded in an executive order applied to 
regulatory agencies since the Reagan administration. The current order, Executive Order 12,866, 
requires agencies to “propose or adopt a new regulation only upon a reasoned determination that 
the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs” [68]. 
Those economists and legal scholars who favor cost-benefit balancing do so because they 
believe it can achieve the most risk reduction for the resources devoted to meeting risk standards 
[66, 67, 69]. Currently, the estimated net benefits of risk regulation vary markedly across, and 
within, policy areas. Some regulations have been estimated to cost only in the tens of thousands 
of dollars per life saved; others have been estimated to cost billions of dollars for each life saved 
[70]. 
Despite the attraction of cost-benefit balancing, many scholars and political officials have 
resisted its widespread application. Applying this approach requires converting the costs and 
benefits of risk regulation into a common metric, typically a monetary one. The monetization of 
benefits generates objections in particular when these benefits involve the protection of human 
life [71, 72]. Of course, even if benefits are not explicitly monetized, when regulators choose 
between policy alternatives with greater and lesser levels of risk control they are implicitly 
making value judgments about health and life. Additional value judgments must be made when 
the costs and benefits of control are not equally distributed, as frequently is the case. 
Applying cost-benefit balancing also raises a series of other choices over how to estimate 
benefits and costs. One choice is whether to rely on estimates of how much individuals are 
willing to accept to forego risk reduction versus how much they are willing to pay to secure the 
same reduction. Although theoretically these two choices should lead to comparable amounts, 
willingness-to-accept amounts have sometimes been higher than willingness-to-pay amounts for 
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equivalent risks [73]. In practice, economists typically have relied on willingness-to-pay 
amounts. 
Another choice centers on the methods for obtaining value estimates, primarily for 
benefits that do not normally have market prices associated with them. Regulatory analysts can 
try to extrapolate using revealed preference methods, such as those that use the differences in 
wages in jobs with different risk profiles to extrapolate a monetized value of a statistical life 
[74]. Alternatively, analysts can rely on stated preference methods, such as contingent valuation 
surveys that ask individuals how much they would be willing to pay (or accept) for certain levels 
of risk reductions (or risk exposures) [74]. 
A final choice in applying the efficiency principle involves the discount rate used to place 
all monetary estimates into present value [75]. Not all costs and benefits occur at the same time; 
regulations addressing health risks with long latency periods will incur immediate costs but will 
deliver benefits only on a longer time horizon. The choice of what discount rate to use may 
affect the determination of whether a new risk standard will yield positive net benefits, as higher 
discount rates will tend to make long-term benefits smaller in present value terms [76]. 
 
Designing Risk Regulatory Instruments 
In addition to determining risk standards’ stringency, regulators also must choose the 
form or design of risk regulation. Many environmental, health, and safety risk standards are 
designed to direct regulated firms to adopt specific means of risk control, such as by mandating 
the use of protective devices on machinery or the installation of specific pollution control 
techniques. Other risk standards impose an obligation on firms to meet a stated level of 
performance, such as when they prohibit pollution that exceeds specified emissions limits. Such 
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performance standards provide firms with more flexibility as each firm can choose its own 
means of meeting the required level of performance [77]. But both means-specific and 
performance standards – sometimes together referred to as “command-and-control” regulation – 
treat all firms equally, requiring each firm either to adopt the same type of risk control measures 
or achieve the same level of risk control. Since the costs of risk control can vary across firms, a 
one-size-fits-all approach can result in excessive overall costs from risk regulation. 
A more cost-effective way of achieving the same level of aggregate risk reduction would 
have firms with lower costs of control reduce risk more than firms with higher costs of control. 
For this reason, market-based regulatory instruments have been long advocated, and occasionally 
implemented, because they allow firms to achieve different levels of control. Market-based 
instruments include taxes, ideally set equal to the costs that risky activity imposes on society 
[78], and tradable permit systems [79, 80]. With tradable permits, the regulator determines an 
overall level of aggregate risk (or a level of a proxy for that risk), issues individual output 
permits that add up to the desired aggregate level, and then allows firms to trade their individual 
permits with each other. In the environmental area where this approach has been most 
prominently used, tradable permits have been thought to be better suited for risks that arise from 
mixable pollutants than for those that arise from exposure to highly toxic chemicals. The 
flexibility tradable permits affords regulated entities can lead to concentrated “hot spots” with 
higher levels of pollution, even if overall levels decline. For risk problems where some variation 
in risky outputs is acceptable -- because it is the overall level of such outputs that matters -- 
market-based instruments can lower costs. With regulatory instruments like tradable permits, 
firms can have an incentive to make even greater reductions in risky behavior so they can sell 
their excess credits. Economists have analyzed the conditions for deploying either taxes or 
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tradable permits [81, 82], and a body of research on market-based risk regulation has 
development as governments have experimented with its use [83, 84]. The U.S. government has 
successfully deployed tradable permits both to phase out the use of lead additives in gasoline [65, 
85, 86] as well as to reduce emissions of sulfur dioxide from coal-powered electric utilities [87]. 
To work effectively, market-based instruments require government regulators to monitor 
and measure outputs. But some risks – or precursors to risks – are quite difficult or costly to 
monitor. This may be because (a) they arise only from relatively low probability events, (b) the 
causal pathways to the risk are complex, or (c) a monitoring technology does not readily exist. 
In such circumstances, regulators have sometimes responded by adopting management-based 
regulations, mandating that firms themselves identify the risks posed from their own operations 
and develop internal policies and procedures to manage those risks [88, 89]. A well-known 
example is the application of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) requirements 
on food-processing facilities by governments around the world. Under HACCP, food processors 
are required to identify critical points where contamination could arise in their production 
processes, and then to develop their own measures for preventing such contamination from 
arising and ensuring that their employees carry out these measures [90]. Management-based 
regulation has been demonstrated to achieve reductions [91], but especially when it is used in 
situations where governmental monitoring is difficult, management-based regulation can never 
be said to guarantee that firms will invest the resources needed to make socially optimal risk 
reductions [92, 93]. 
Much the same can be said of other alternative regulatory responses. Governments 
sometimes impose information disclosure requirements, either providing consumers or the 
government information about the risks associated with their products or processes. Such 
 16 
information-based strategies have long been a staple of financial regulation, but they have also 
been used in recent years to address health and safety risks in a variety of areas [94, 95]. 
Information disclosure appears more likely to prove effective when it actually can affect 
decisions by investors or customers, giving rise to other (non-regulatory) pressures for risk 
reduction. 
The U.S. Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) program, adopted in the late 1980s, requires 
certain companies to disclose their emissions of toxic chemicals [96]. Some researchers have 
suggested that the pressures activated by TRI-reporting led firms to reduce their toxic emissions 
by substantial amounts [97, 98]. Of course, these studies have not adequately accounted for the 
contributions of more conventional regulation to this decline, which is important to consider 
given that nearly contemporaneous amendments to the Clean Air Act imposed new regulatory 
controls on the same hazardous air pollutants that would be reported under TRI. For this reason, 
TRI’s unique impact on toxic emissions remains, “to date, unknown” [96: 242]. 
More research will be needed to assess the effectiveness of innovative regulatory designs 
like market-based instruments, management-based regulation, and information disclosure. 
Evaluation research can be conducted on their existing application to risk problems as well as the 
use to address new forms of risk. Governments are only likely to continue to experiment with 
these and perhaps new forms of regulatory instruments altogether in the face of pressing or 
emerging areas of risk ranging from global climate change to nanotechnology. Empirical 
evaluation of these new regulatory strategies should aim to compare the outcomes achieved 
under innovative policies with a realistic appraisal of more conventional forms of regulation 
[99]. Conventional regulation is certainly not immune from outcomes that are ineffectual or 
even counterproductive. Regulation of any kind can lead to adaptations in behavior that offset 
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the risk reductions intended to be achieved through regulation. If drivers in cars with seat belts 
or airbags end up driving faster [100, 101], or if parents are more likely to leave medications 
with child-resistant packaging in areas accessible to their small children [102], protective 
regulations will not reduce risk as much as their designers may intend and sometimes they may 
even create or exacerbate other kinds of risks. 
 
Conclusion 
Regulation provides a central means for government to manage the risks associated with 
today’s global, industrialized economy. Markets themselves cannot adequately protect the 
public from hidden hazards or spillover harms. Ex post liability, while useful, does not always 
by itself provide a socially optimal level of risk control. As such, preventative risk regulation 
will be needed, and the core questions will remain ones of how stringent such regulation should 
be and what form such regulation should take. Risk regulation research will continue to be 
needed to provide conceptual clarity to the normative basis for risk standards as well as to 
generate better empirical evidence on the effectiveness, efficiency, and equity of applying 
particular regulatory instruments under varied risk conditions. 
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